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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
On January 4, 1983, a Pennsylvania state court 
sentenced Victor Hassine to life in prison, following his 
1981 conviction on charges of first degree murder, 
attempted murder, criminal conspiracy, and criminal 
solicitation. Now, more than fifteen years later, we are faced 
with the question of whether to vacate Hassine's conviction 
by granting his petition for habeas relief brought pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. S 2254. Hassine contends that relief is 
warranted because the state prosecutor sought to use his 
post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes at trial in 
violation of the due process principles established in Doyle 
v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). The district court found that 
a Doyle violation had occurred, but it concluded that any 
constitutional error was harmless under the standard 
announced in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). 
We agree that the prosecutor violated Doyle by seeking to 
elicit testimony concerning Hassine's post-arrest silence. 
We also agree that Brecht is the proper standard to apply 
on collateral review. Because we agree further that the 
Doyle violation was harmless under Brecht, we will affirm. 
 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
A. The Murder Conspiracy 
 
This case arises out a conspiracy involving Hassine and 
his co-conspirators George Gregory Orlowski and William 
Eric Decker, which culminated in the August 22, 1980, 
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murder of James Puerale and the shootings of Albert "Skip" 
Kellet and Lois Kellet. 
 
The evidence at trial showed that Hassine first met 
Orlowski in 1979, and that shortly thereafter they decided 
to open a store in Morrisville, Pennsylvania, called Greg's 
Quality Meat Market ("the Market"). The store was financed 
by Hassine's family, overseen and supervised by Hassine 
himself, and operated on a daily basis by Orlowski. 
However, the Market soon experienced financial problems, 
and, with Hassine's knowledge, Orlowski began selling 
marijuana and methamphetamine from a back room in the 
store. 
 
In June 1980, Albert Kellet, a close friend of Orlowski, 
purchased $150 of methamphetamine at the Market. Upon 
returning home, Kellet discovered that the drugs were of 
inferior quality and he became enraged. He called Orlowski 
and invited him to his apartment under the false pretense 
of wishing to buy more methamphetamine. When Orlowski 
arrived, Kellet threatened him with a club, stole all of his 
money and drugs, and threw him out of the apartment. 
 
Several days later, Orlowski, Hassine, and Decker, among 
others, met at the Market to discuss Kellet's actions. The 
State's witnesses testified that at this meeting, Hassine 
announced that he wanted Kellet "wasted" and that if Lois 
Kellet, Albert's wife, was present, she "was to go also, 
because any witnesses had to go." As a result, Hassine, 
Decker, and Orlowski made several attempts over the next 
month to obtain a gun with which to kill Kellet, and they 
investigated the possibility of paying two other individuals 
to have Kellet murdered. A number of confrontations 
between Hassine and Kellet also erupted during this time, 
and, on at least one occasion, Hassine instructed Decker to 
shoot Kellet and to kill him. Because it was daylight and a 
witness was present, Decker declined. Nevertheless, on 
August 22, 1980, Decker had his own encounter with 
Kellet, and he returned to the Market to tell Hassine that 
"[t]onight's the night -- the cat's got to go. We'll use your 
gun." 
 
According to the State's witnesses, Hassine picked 
Decker up later that evening and drove him to Hassine's 
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parents' house in Trenton, New Jersey. While Decker waited 
in the car, Hassine entered the house and obtained his 
father's .380 caliber Llama handgun. Hassine then drove 
Decker to Kellet's apartment building and gave him the gun 
and a New York Yankees batting helmet to cover his hair. 
As Decker approached the building, he saw Kellet in a first- 
floor apartment watching television with his wife Lois, and 
with James Puerale and George Sofield. Decker entered the 
apartment, surveyed the room, and opened fire, killing 
Puerale instantly and injuring Skip and Lois Kellet with 
shots to the head. 
 
The police arrested Decker the next day, and arrested 
Hassine three months later, charging Hassine withfirst 
degree murder, attempted murder, conspiracy, and 
solicitation. 
 
B. The Murder Trial 
 
The State presented thirty-four witnesses at Hassine's 
trial, including Decker, who had negotiated a plea bargain 
with the District Attorney to avoid the death penalty. 
Decker and the other witnesses testified as to the details of 
the murder conspiracy and described Hassine's extensive 
involvement in the plot to murder Kellet. 
 
Hassine then took the stand in his own defense and, for 
the first time since his arrest, offered an innocent 
explanation for his role in the conspiracy. He testified that 
he had obtained his father's gun and stored it in the 
Market after Orlowski had asked him for protection from 
Kellet. He then claimed that Decker entered the Market on 
the day of the murder, and, without Hassine's knowledge, 
took the gun and left the store "ranting and raving, saying 
he was going to get Skip Kellet." Hassine thus maintained 
that he never told Decker to kill Kellet, that he never gave 
Decker a gun with which to carry out the crime, and that 
he was never part of the murder conspiracy. 
 
Attempting to discredit these claims, the prosecutor 
asked Hassine a series of questions on cross-examination 
regarding Hassine's post-arrest silence. In particular, he 
inquired three times as to why Hassine had not offered the 
same exculpatory story to the authorities following his 
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arrest. Hassine's attorney objected each time, believing that 
the questions violated Hassine's rights under Doyle v. Ohio, 
which provides that the government cannot use a 
defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence for 
impeachment purposes at trial. 426 U.S. at 610. The trial 
judge agreed, sustaining the objections and preventing 
Hassine from answering the prosecutor's questions. The 
prosecutor also made two general references to Hassine's 
silence in his closing argument. Nevertheless, the court did 
not provide curative instructions during Hassine's 
testimony or in the jury charge. 
 
The case was sent to the jury at the close of all evidence, 
and on June 11, 1981, the jury found Hassine guilty and 
recommended that he be sentenced to life in prison on the 
charge of first degree murder. After denying Hassine's 
motions for a new trial and arrest of judgment, the court 
adopted the jury's recommendation and sentenced Hassine 
to life imprisonment, in addition to several consecutive 
prison terms extending from two to twenty years. 
 
C. Review of the State Court Conviction 
 
Hassine appealed his conviction to the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania, assigning fifteen reversible errors to the trial 
court. See Commonwealth v. Hassine, 490 A.2d 438, 443- 
44 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) ("Hassine I"). Among other things, 
he argued that the state prosecutor had violated the due 
process principles established in Doyle by interrogating him 
on the witness stand about his post-arrest silence. On 
February 8, 1985, the Superior Court denied Hassine's 
appeal in its entirety and affirmed his sentence,finding 
that his list of alleged errors was "short on merit," id. at 
444, and rejecting his claim of prosecutorial misconduct 
based on Doyle. Relying on state precedent, the court noted 
that testimony regarding post-arrest silence can be elicited 
"to refute contrary statements volunteered by the defendant 
to demonstrate his cooperation at the time of questioning," 
id. at 451 (quoting Commonwealth v. Bey, 439 A.2d 1175, 
1177 (1982)), and concluded that "[w]e believe this occurred 
here. The district attorney elicited testimony designed to 
rebut [Hassine's] claim that he cooperated with the police, 
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not to suggest [Hassine's] guilt to the jury. Hence we find 
no error." Hassine I, 490 A.2d at 451. 
 
On May 13, 1985, Hassine applied for a Petition for 
Allowance of Appeal in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 
claiming again, inter alia, that the prosecution asked 
improper questions at trial about his post-arrest silence. 
On April 15, 1986, however, the state Supreme Court 
denied the Petition and Hassine's conviction became final. 
 
Hassine chose not to seek a writ of certiorari from the 
Supreme Court of the United States, but instead filed a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the district court 
on October 28, 1986. Among other things, Hassine argued 
once again that the prosecutor had exploited his post-arrest 
silence as an impeachment tactic in violation of due 
process and Doyle. The district court referred the petition to 
a Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation in 
accordance with 28 U.S.C. S 636(b)(1)(B), and on June 15, 
1988, the Magistrate Judge recommended that relief be 
denied. After reviewing the record in detail, the Magistrate 
Judge found strong evidence "that the jury may have 
impermissibly been able to draw an inference between 
petitioner's silence and his guilt, thus clearly infringing 
upon petitioner's due process rights as established in 
Doyle." Nevertheless, he concluded that any constitutional 
error was harmless, because "[t]he evidence against 
Hassine was overwhelming." 
 
Hassine filed several objections to the Report and 
Recommendation, and the district court granted de novo 
review of the Magistrate Judge's findings consistent with 28 
U.S.C. S 636(b)(1)(C). One year later, on November 15, 
1989, the district court issued a Memorandum and Order 
agreeing with the Magistrate Judge's ruling that the jury 
had been permitted "to draw an impermissible inference of 
guilt from Hassine's silence" in violation of Doyle and its 
progeny. Hassine v. Zimmerman, No. Civ. A. 86-6315, 1989 
WL 140491, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 1989) ("Hassine II"). 
However, the district court withheld a final decision on 
Hassine's petition, because it believed that oral argument 
was needed on the question of whether the trial error had 
been harmless. 
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Oral argument was held on December 1, 1989, but the 
court did not immediately issue a ruling, and no further 
events transpired in the case for the next three and a half 
years. On April 21, 1993, the Supreme Court announced its 
decision in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), 
altering the standard for harmless error in habeas cases 
involving constitutional trial flaws. Prior to Brecht, the 
Court had held in Chapman v. California that habeas relief 
should be denied in the event of constitutional trial error 
only if the prosecution could prove that the error was 
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 386 U.S. 18, 24 
(1967). In Brecht, however, the Supreme Court announced 
a new test for harmless error in habeas cases, namely, 
whether the error "had substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining the jury's verdict." 507 U.S. at 623 
(quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 
(1946)). If not, habeas relief should be denied. 
 
Realizing the potential impact of the new standard on 
Hassine's petition, the district court scheduled a July 29, 
1993, conference call to discuss several matters, including 
"the significance, if any" of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Brecht. Following that call, the parties submitted letter 
briefs to the district court regarding whether Hassine's 
claims should be evaluated under Brecht or Chapman and 
whether harmless error could be found under either 
standard. However, two more years passed, and on May 4, 
1995, the district court conducted yet another oral 
argument concerning whether Brecht should be applied to 
Hassine's petition. Still, no decision issued, and the parties 
filed at least ten additional letter briefs in the ensuing two 
years. 
 
Finally, on October 30, 1997 -- more than eleven years 
from the date on which Hassine first filed his habeas 
petition -- the district court reached a decision on the 
merits of the harmless error claim. The court examined the 
caselaw and the rationales supporting the rule in Brecht 
and concluded that "[t]his court must apply the Brecht 
standard" to Hassine's petition for relief. Hassine v. 
Zimmerman, No. Civ. A. 86-6315, 1997 WL 677152, at *5 
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 1997) ("Hassine III"). After conducting an 
extensive review of the record and the evidence supporting 
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the jury's verdict, the court then held that the Doyle error 
at Hassine's trial was harmless, because "the record, 
considered as a whole, demonstrates that the direct and 
circumstantial evidence of [Hassine's] guilt was 
overwhelming." Id. at *7. The court determined that "the 
prosecutor's improper reference to Hassine's post-arrest 
silence, although a constitutional violation under Doyle, did 
not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on 
the jury's guilty verdict" within the meaning of Brecht. Id. at 
*10. 
 
The district court issued a certificate of probable cause 
allowing Hassine to file a timely appeal, and we now have 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
SS 1291 and 2253.1 Because the district court relied entirely 
on the state court record and did not hold an evidentiary 
hearing, our review is plenary. See Johnson v. Rosemeyer, 
117 F.3d 104, 109 (3d Cir. 1997). Acting in the same 
capacity as the district court, we will presume that the 
factual findings of the state courts are correct if fairly 
supported by the record, but we will exercise plenary review 
over state court conclusions on mixed questions of law and 
fact and pure issues of law. See Ahmad v. Redman , 782 
F.2d 409, 412 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 
II. THE DOYLE VIOLATION 
 
The Supreme Court established in Doyle v. Ohio that it is 
improper for a prosecutor to cause the jury to draw an 
impermissible inference of guilt from a defendant's post- 
arrest silence. 426 U.S. at 610. Doyle involved two 
defendants who, upon taking the witness stand in their 
own defense, claimed that a narcotics informant had 
framed them for the crime. The prosecutor asked each 
defendant on cross-examination whether he had told the 
"framing" story to the police after his arrest. Defense 
counsel objected strenuously, arguing that the prosecution 
could not impeach the defendants on this basis because 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. This case is not subject to the terms of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214 (1996), because Hassine filed his habeas petition well before the 
April 24, 1996, date on which the AEDPA took effect. 
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the defendants were merely exercising their right to remain 
silent after arrest. However, the objections were overruled 
and the defendants were compelled to admit that they had 
not provided an exculpatory story to the authorities 
following their arrests and the reading of their Miranda 
rights. 
 
On appeal, the defendants argued that the prosecutor's 
line of questioning violated the due process guarantees 
inherent in the right to remain silent. The Supreme Court 
agreed, reversing their convictions in light of Miranda's 
implicit assurance that silence will have no adverse 
consequences. The Court stated that "it would be 
fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to 
allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach 
an explanation subsequently offered at trial." Id. at 618. 
Therefore, the Court held, "the use for impeachment 
purposes of petitioners' silence, at the time of arrest and 
after receiving Miranda warnings, violate[s] the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 619. 
 
In this case, we believe that the state prosecutor violated 
the due process principles established in Doyle  by seeking 
to elicit testimony about Hassine's post-arrest, post- 
Miranda silence. The record shows that the prosecutor's 
cross-examination of Hassine proceeded as follows: 
 
Prosecutor:  How long have you been sitting in jail, sir? 
Hassine:     Close to seven months. 
Prosecutor:  And you have been sitting in Bucks Country 
             Prison? 
Hassine:     No, sir. 
Prosecutor:  You were in Bucks County Prison for a time? 
Hassine:     About a month and a half. 
Prosecutor:  You were sitting in Holmesburg Prison? 
Hassine:     For about five months. 
Prosecutor:  And another prison? 
Hassine:     Delaware County. 
Prosecutor:  And conditions are not very good? 
Hassine:     No, sir. 
Prosecutor:  You sat for seven months in prison with the 
             knowledge of what was really involved in 
             regard to this gun, and you just kept it to 
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       yourself because your attorney said to keep it 
       to yourself? 
 
  Hassine's Attorney:  Objection. 
  The Court:           Sustained. 
 
Prosecutor: But you kept it to yourself until you came in 
            to a court of law today and said it for the first 
            time, in any event, outside of perhaps your 
            family or your lawyer? 
 
  Hassine's Attorney: Objection. 
 
Prosecutor: For the first time? 
 
  Hassine's Attorney:  That is objected to. 
  The Court:           Sustained. 
 
On three occasions, and over three objections, the 
prosecutor asked Hassine why he had remained silent 
about the crime after his arrest and after Miranda warnings 
had been given. It is clear from these questions that the 
prosecutor was attempting to elicit the precise inferences 
that the State is prohibited from exploiting under Doyle. 
Further, the trial court did not provide, and defense 
counsel did not request, any curative instructions for the 
jury. In this regard, the instant case is distinguishable from 
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987), where the Supreme 
Court found no Doyle violation. In Greer, the sequence of 
events "-- a single question, an immediate objection, and 
two curative instructions -- clearly indicate[d] that the 
prosecutor's improper question did not violate [the 
petitioner's] due process rights." Id. at 766. Here, the 
prosecutor asked questions concerning the amount of time 
Hassine had spent in prison, questioned Hassine about the 
poor conditions he had experienced in confinement, and 
then, despite objections by the defense, asked three 
questions that are clearly prohibited by Doyle, and then 
made statements in his closing that could be understood to 
refer to that same silence. Moreover, the trial court gave no 
curative instructions at all. We thus find that the 
government violated Hassine's right to due process under 
Doyle. 
 
In so ruling we reject the State's argument, and the view 
of the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Hassine I, 490 A.2d 
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at 451, that the prosecutor's questions were nonetheless 
permissible because Hassine had "opened the door" in his 
direct testimony to inquiries about his post-arrest silence. 
Hassine had told the jury on direct examination that his 
attorney had offered to make him "available to the police," 
by, for example, offering to present his father to the police 
"in connection with identifying the gun." The State 
contends that by asking Hassine about his post-arrest 
silence, the prosecutor was merely challenging Hassine's 
testimony as to his behavior following arrest by impeaching 
Hassine's claim on direct examination that he was 
"available" and willing to cooperate with the authorities. 
 
The State's argument is based on an exception contained 
in footnote eleven in Doyle, which provides that "post-arrest 
silence could be used by the prosecution to contradict a 
defendant who testifies to an exculpatory version of events 
and claims to have told the police the same version upon 
arrest." 426 U.S. at 619 n.11. As the Supreme Court 
explained, "[i]n that situation the fact of earlier silence 
would not be used to impeach the exculpatory story, but 
rather to challenge the defendant's testimony as to his 
behavior following arrest." Id. 
 
We agree that the State's argument has some allure 
under Doyle as a basis for the prosecutor to use Hassine's 
post-arrest silence for impeachment. However, we find, as 
the district court did, that Hassine's direct testimony was 
far too innocuous and ambiguous to constitute an 
exculpatory version that would justify the pointed cross- 
examination in this case. The Doyle footnote applies when 
a witness testifies on the stand to a version of events and 
indicates that he previously told that version to law 
enforcement. The government can then pursue its position 
that the story was not previously told, and may bring out 
on cross-examination the fact that the defendant was silent 
following arrest. As the one case cited in the Doyle footnote 
makes clear, "to be admissible, keeping silence must be 
much more than ambiguous. It must appear to be an act 
blatantly inconsistent with the defendant's trial testimony." 
United States v. Fairchild, 505 F.2d 1378, 1382 (5th Cir. 
1975). In this case, however, there is no contention that 
Hassine described a version of events on the stand and 
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indicated that he had previously told that same story to the 
police. Rather, the only testimony which harkens back to 
Hassine's previous behavior deals with his declaration that 
he was "available" for further questioning. Hassine did not 
claim to have told the police an exculpatory story after 
arrest, did not imply that he had participated actively in the 
investigation, and never suggested that he had surrendered 
his right to silence by speaking directly with the 
authorities. The only relevance of the prosecutor's 
questioning to Hassine's previous silence, therefore, 
implicates his right to remain silent more than it 
constitutes questioning probative of his truth or credibility.2 
 
The Doyle footnote exception only permits the 
prosecution to use post-arrest silence to impeach the 
credibility of the defendant's version of what he did 
following arrest; the government cannot use the silence to 
impeach the exculpatory story itself or to draw inferences 
suggesting the defendant's guilt. See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619 
n.11; United States v. Gant, 17 F.3d 935, 941 (7th Cir. 
1994) ("[T]he government may use defendant's silence for 
the limited purpose of impeaching his testimony; it may not 
argue that the defendant's silence is inconsistent with his 
claim of innocence."); Alo v. Olim, 639 F.2d 466, 468 (9th 
Cir. 1980) (questions implying that the defendant's silence 
is substantive evidence of guilt are not permitted under the 
Doyle exception). In the present case, rather than simply 
asking Hassine if he had told his story to the police after 
arrest, the prosecutor asked incredulously, "[y]ou sat for 
seven months in prison with the knowledge of what was 
really involved in regard to the his gun, and you just kept 
it to yourself because your attorney said to keep it to 
yourself?" We believe that questions like this clearly invite 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Hassine's appeal thus differs greatly from Fairchild, where the court 
determined that post-arrest silence was admissible because the defense 
attorney had specifically asked the defendant if he had "cooperated fully 
with the FBI and U.S. Attorney's office in responding with anything that 
you all wanted." 505 F.2d at 1383; see also Leecan v. Lopes, 893 F.2d 
1434, 1442 (2d Cir. 1990) (emphasis added) (finding that an inquiry into 
post-arrest silence was warranted where the defendant's testimony "left 
the clear implication that he had proffered his alibi to the police upon 
surrender"). 
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the jury -- in violation of Doyle -- to reject Hassine's story 
and to infer that Hassine's post-arrest silence was a sign of 
his guilt. 
 
Consequently, we conclude that the footnote eleven 
exception in Doyle is of no aid to the State. The prosecutor 
violated Hassine's right to due process at trial by seeking to 
draw impermissible inferences about Hassine's post- 
Miranda silence following arrest. 
 
III. HARMLESS ERROR 
 
Having found a violation of Hassine's federal 
constitutional rights, we turn next to the issue of whether 
the error at Hassine's trial can be characterized as 
harmless. The Supreme Court has identified two types of 
constitutional errors: structural and trial. See Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-10 (1991). "A structural 
error is a defect in the trial mechanism itself, affecting the 
entire trial process, and is per se prejudicial." Yohn v. Love, 
76 F.3d 508, 522 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). By 
contrast, "trial error occurs during the presentation of the 
case to the jury, and may be quantitatively assessed in the 
context of all other evidence." Id. The Supreme Court has 
written that "Doyle error fits squarely into the category of 
constitutional violations which we have characterized as 
trial error." Brecht, 507 U.S. at 629 (quotation omitted). 
Therefore, we must assess whether the Doyle violation at 
Hassine's trial constitutes harmless error in the context of 
all the evidence presented by the State. 
 
The nature of the harmless error inquiry, however, has 
been modified during the pendency of Hassine's habeas 
corpus proceedings, as discussed above. For many years, 
the standard in both direct and collateral appeals for 
determining whether a constitutional trial error was 
harmless was the test established in Chapman v. California, 
which held that a conviction would be vacated unless the 
government could prove that the error was "harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt." 386 U.S. at 24. In 1993, 
however, the Supreme Court held in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 
507 U.S. at 619, that harmless error in habeas cases 
should be judged instead by the standard for 
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nonconstitutional errors set forth in Kotteakos v. United 
States. Thus, under Brecht, habeas relief can now be 
granted on collateral review only if the constitutional trial 
error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in 
determining the jury's verdict." 507 U.S. at 623 (quoting 
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776).3 
 
Ordinarily, this would present no problem on appeal, 
because we would apply the Brecht standard to a petitioner 
seeking habeas relief. In this case, though, Hassine argues 
that he is entitled to the benefit of the older, more stringent 
Chapman standard because no state court has ever 
evaluated his claim under Chapman on direct review. 
Before proceeding to an application of the harmless error 
test, we must therefore resolve the following threshold 
issue: should a federal court apply the Brecht standard for 
harmless error in a habeas case where the state courts 
have never conducted a review of the error on direct appeal 
under Chapman? The district court found that Brecht 
should apply regardless of the actions of the state courts, 
and we agree. 
 
A. Whether Brecht or Chapman Should Apply 
 
The federal courts remain divided as to whether Brecht or 
Chapman applies in a situation in which a habeas 
petitioner has never had his claim evaluated under 
Chapman on direct appeal. The Eighth Circuit, and at least 
two district courts, have concluded that the "rule 
announced in Brecht does not apply and that the Chapman 
harmless error standard is the appropriate test in this 
case." Orndorff v. Lockhart, 998 F.2d 1426, 1430 (8th Cir. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Brecht adopts a more deferential standard on collateral review for 
cases involving constitutional trial errors. Nevertheless, the degree of 
the 
difference in practice remains to be seen as the new test is applied. As 
Justice Stevens, whose concurrence provided the decisive fifth vote in 
Brecht, noted, "[g]iven the critical importance of the faculty of judgment 
in administering either standard, however, th[e] difference [in emphasis] 
is less significant than it might seem . . . . In the end, the way we 
phrase 
the governing standard is far less important than the quality of the 
judgment with which it is applied." 507 U.S. at 643 (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
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1993); see also Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 1280, 1292 (8th 
Cir. 1994); Lyons v. Johnson, 912 F. Supp. 679, 687-89 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 99 F.3d 499 (2d Cir. 1996); Rickman 
v. Dutton, 864 F. Supp. 686, 712 (M.D. Tenn. 1994), aff'd 
sub nom. Rickman v. Bell, 131 F.3d 1150 (6th Cir. 1997). 
By contrast, the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and 
Eleventh circuits have all held that "Brecht, rather than 
Chapman, enunciates the appropriate standard for 
determining whether a constitutional error was harmless in 
a federal habeas challenge to a state conviction or 
sentence," regardless of the standard employed by the state 
courts. Hogue v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 466, 499 (5th Cir. 
1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S. Ct. 1297, (1998);4 
see also Sherman v. Smith, 89 F.3d 1134, 1140-41 (4th Cir. 
1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. #6D6D 6D#, 117 S. Ct. 765 (1997); 
Brewer v. Reynolds, 51 F.3d 1519, 1529 (10th Cir. 1995); 
Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 446-47 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 1041 (1996); Horsley v. Alabama, 45 F.3d 
1486, 1492 n.11 (11th Cir. 1995).5 Hassine contends that 
we should not implement Brecht as we normally would, but 
that we should cling to the old Chapman standard, 
notwithstanding the new formulation handed down by the 
Supreme Court. However, we are unwilling to find an 
exception to Brecht's "standard formula," Tyson, 50 F.3d at 
446, because we disagree with the four arguments that 
Hassine offers in contending that Chapman should apply. 
 
First, the plain language of Brecht makes no distinction 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. A panel of the Fifth Circuit recently noted its disagreement with 
Hogue, but concluded that "we may not ignore the [Hogue] decision, for 
in this circuit one panel may not overrule the decision of a prior panel." 
Barber v. Johnson, 145 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. 
filed, (U.S. Sep. 10, 1998) (No. 98-6001). Hogue thus remains good law 
in the Fifth Circuit. 
 
5. Two courts passed on the issue after finding that the trial error would 
not have been harmless under either standard. See Lyons v. Johnson, 99 
F.3d 499, 503 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[D]ue to the magnitude of the trial court's 
error . . . we need not decide whether . . . Chapman or Brecht is the 
appropriate standard to apply in this case."); Hanna v. Riveland, 87 F.3d 
1034, 1038 n.2 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e do not need to decide this issue 
because, even under Brecht's less stringent standard of review, the error 
cannot be deemed harmless."). 
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that requires us to employ Chapman on collateral review. 
The issue in Brecht was "whether the Chapman harmless- 
error standard applies in determining whether the 
prosecution's use for impeachment purposes of petitioner's 
post-Miranda silence, in violation of due process under 
Doyle v. Ohio, entitles petitioner to habeas corpus relief." 
507 U.S. at 622-23 (footnote and citation omitted). The 
Court held that "the Kotteakos harmless-error standard 
applies in determining whether habeas relief must be 
granted because of constitutional error of the trial type." Id. 
at 638; see also id. at 623 ("[T]he standard for determining 
whether habeas relief must be granted is whether the Doyle 
error `had substantial and injurious effect or influence in 
determining the jury's verdict.' ") (quoting Kotteakos, 328 
U.S. at 776). The Court never restricted the issues or the 
holding in Brecht to situations where a petitioner has 
already had his or her claim evaluated by the state courts 
under Chapman. Therefore, we are not persuaded that we 
should read an exception into Brecht's harmless error rule 
when no such exception is even implicit in the Court's 
opinion. 
 
Second, in contrast to the views of some courts, we do 
not believe that we should regard the facts in Brecht as 
limiting the Court's holding to cases in which Chapman has 
previously been applied. Because the Court decided Brecht 
after the Wisconsin Supreme Court had already ruled on 
the harmless error issue under Chapman, several courts 
have viewed prior Chapman review as integral to Brecht's 
result.6 We disagree. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. For example, the Eighth Circuit has written that Brecht was "based 
largely on the notion that because the state courts can properly apply 
the Chapman harmless error standard on direct review, the federal 
habeas courts need only review those decisions under the Kotteakos 
harmless error standard." Orndorff, 998 F.2d at 1430. Likewise, the 
district court in Lyons stated that Brecht "was premised largely on 
respect for the actual, conscientious review of harmlessness performed 
by four prior courts -- both federal and state-- that applied Chapman." 
912 F. Supp. at 689. These courts thus believe that Brecht intended to 
alter the harmless error standard only for those habeas cases which, like 
Brecht, involved a previous application of Chapman on direct appeal. 
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While the Court noted that "it scarcely seems logical to 
require federal habeas courts to engage in the identical 
approach to harmless-error review that Chapman requires 
state courts to engage in on direct review," 507 U.S. at 636, 
its holding was based primarily on a finding -- apart from 
the particular facts or history of the case -- that "the costs 
of applying the Chapman standard on federal habeas 
outweigh the additional deterrent effect, if any, that would 
be derived from its application on collateral review." Id. 
 
In Brecht, the Court identified four considerations in 
justifying the application of a more relaxed harmless error 
standard for habeas petitions, including the States' 
interests in the finality of convictions, comity, federalism, 
and the recognition that "liberal allowance of the writ 
degrades the prominence of the trial itself." Id. at 635 
(quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982)). The 
Court then reasoned comprehensively that: 
 
       [o]verturning final and presumptively correct 
       convictions on collateral review because the State 
       cannot prove that an error is harmless under Chapman 
       undermines the States' interest in finality and infringes 
       upon their sovereignty over criminal matters. Moreover, 
       granting habeas relief merely because there is a 
       reasonable possibility that trial error contributed to the 
       verdict, is at odds with the historic meaning of habeas 
       corpus -- to afford relief to those whom society has 
       grievously wronged. Retrying defendants whose 
       convictions are set aside also imposes significant social 
       costs, including the expenditure of additional time and 
       resources for all the parties involved, the erosion of 
       memory and dispersion of witnesses that accompany 
       the passage of time and make obtaining convictions on 
       retrial more difficult, and the frustration of society's 
       interest in the prompt administration of justice. 
 
507 U.S. at 637 (citations and quotations omitted). This 
analysis led the Court to conclude that "[t]he imbalance of 
the costs and benefits of applying the Chapman harmless- 
error standard on collateral review counsels in favor of 
applying a less onerous standard on habeas review of 
constitutional error." Id. at 637; see also id. at 637-38 ("The 
Kotteakos standard is . . . better tailored to the nature and 
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purpose of collateral review and more likely to promote the 
considerations underlying our recent habeas cases."). Thus, 
Brecht was clearly not premised on the notion that the state 
courts had already conducted a Chapman review of 
harmless error on direct appeal. The fact that the state 
courts may or may not have performed such a review was 
of minor importance to the Court's view that the Kotteakos 
standard should be applied consistently in collateral 
proceedings. 
 
Third, contrary to Hassine's argument, we believe that 
the policy interests identified in Brecht are nonetheless 
implicated in cases where the state courts have not 
evaluated a petitioner's claim under Chapman. Hassine 
urges that we follow Lyons, in which a district court stated 
that Brecht should be used only when federal courts would 
be repeating Chapman analyses performed by the state 
courts, because it is only in these situations that the 
federal courts demonstrate a "lack of respect for state 
courts' ability as federal constitutional interpreters, and 
hence . . . violate obligations of comity and principles of 
federalism." 912 F. Supp. at 689; see also Barber, 145 F.3d 
at 238 (Dennis, J., concurring) (stating that the federal 
courts cannot defer "to the systemic values offinality, 
federalism, and comity . . . unless there has in fact been a 
good-faith State effort to protect constitutional rights by 
applying the Chapman standard"). 
 
Once again, however, we disagree. Finality, comity, and 
federalism do not turn on whether the state courts have 
performed a Chapman analysis, but depend, rather, on the 
fact that they have rejected a defendant's direct appeal. 
Indeed, a federal habeas court which overturns a state 
conviction on collateral review still upsets a State's interest 
in finality, and still raises federalism, comity, and trial 
process concerns, regardless of whether the state courts 
have previously identified the constitutional error or have 
performed a Chapman analysis on direct appeal. 
 
In light of the Court's reasoning and holding in Brecht, it 
is anomalous to say that a Chapman standard should apply 
in any habeas case based on concerns such as federalism, 
comity, or finality. Brecht stands for the proposition that 
these concerns are to be advanced by employment of the 
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Brecht standard itself. Thus, not to apply Brecht, and to 
apply instead a less deferential standard, is to nullify not 
merely the policies that the Court has advanced, but the 
very import of the Brecht decision. In fact, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of 
deference to State "sovereignty over criminal matters," 
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, and to the finality of criminal 
judgments, outside the context of Chapman. In Teague v. 
Lane, for example, the Court restricted the ability of habeas 
petitioners to establish new constitutional rules on 
collateral review, in part because the "[a]pplication of 
constitutional rules not in existence at the time a 
conviction became final seriously undermines the principle 
of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal 
justice system." 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989). Likewise, in 
Wright v. West, the Court stressed the "significant costs" of 
habeas review. 505 U.S. 277, 293 (1992) (quoting Engle, 
456 U.S. at 126). "Among other things," the Court wrote, "it 
disturbs the State's significant interest in repose for 
concluded litigation, denies society the right to punish 
some admitted offenders, and intrudes on state sovereignty 
to a degree matched by few exercises of federal judicial 
authority." Wright, 505 U.S. at 293 (quotations omitted). 
 
Therefore, while the absence of a state court Chapman 
review may make the considerations identified in Brecht 
less compelling, it certainly does not eliminate them. As our 
sister circuits have concluded, Brecht is still the general 
rule to apply in habeas cases, even in situations where the 
state courts never employ Chapman, because "principles of 
federalism, comity, and finality apply regardless of the 
harmless error standard used by the state court." Sherman, 
89 F.3d at 1141; see also Tyson, 50 F.3d at 446 ("The 
reasons the Court gave in Brecht for adopting a less 
stringent rule are independent of the rule applied in the 
state appellate process.").7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We do not mean to imply that habeas relief should be limited in the 
name of federalism and comity alone. We note merely that Supreme 
Court jurisprudence requires us to consider the systemic costs of 
applying certain standards on collateral review, and that, in this case, 
those costs are substantial even if the state courts never perform a 
Chapman analysis on direct appeal. 
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Finally, we note that we are wary of the practical impact 
of applying Chapman to every case where a prior Chapman 
review has not occurred. As the Seventh Circuit recognized 
in Tyson, "ordinarily . . . the state court will not have found 
any error and therefore will have had no occasion to apply 
any standard of harmless error. Brecht itself was a fluke in 
this regard; the state courts had considered the issue of 
harmless error and applied the Chapman standard." 50 
F.3d at 446.8 Consequently, any rule requiring Chapman to 
be used when the state courts fail to address harmless 
error would render Brecht inapplicable to the majority of 
habeas petitions and would "rob the decision of any general 
significance." Id. Given the substantial interests identified 
in Brecht, and given the reasoning of the opinion, we find 
it highly unlikely that the Supreme Court could have 
sanctioned such a result. 
 
Cases like Brecht and Teague express the Court's belief 
that collateral review entails heightened deference and 
respect to the state courts, and we must follow governing 
precedent when it applies, as it does here. Accordingly, we 
hold that a federal habeas court performing a harmless 
error inquiry on collateral review must employ the standard 
for harmless error articulated in Brecht, even if the state 
courts have never reviewed the error on direct appeal under 
Chapman. 
 
B. Whether Brecht Should be Applied to Hassine  
 
Even if Brecht applies generally to collateral proceedings, 
Hassine contends that we should still review his claims 
under Chapman due to the unique and unusual facts of his 
case. In particular, he argues that Chapman review is 
appropriate here because (1) he forfeited the right to pursue 
an appeal in the Supreme Court when Chapman was still 
the law for harmless error on collateral review, and because 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The state courts may not use Chapman to evaluate harmless error on 
direct appeal if, as here, they conclude that there was no constitutional 
error and thus do not perform the harmless error analysis at all, if they 
find that the petitioner has defaulted procedurally on his claim, or if 
there is no opportunity to address the error because it is discovered only 
after the defendant has already exhausted his state appeals. 
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(2) the district court proceedings were marked by such 
extensive delay as to violate his right to due process.9 We 
are not persuaded by either contention. 
 
First, the fact that Hassine made the deliberate choice to 
forego seeking relief in the Supreme Court is irrelevant. 
Hassine could not, of course, have anticipated an 
intervening change in the law, but that alone is insufficient 
to prohibit a retroactive application of Brecht on collateral 
review. Hassine made a tactical decision to bypass the 
Supreme Court and to proceed to the district court for 
habeas relief, and we will not reward that decision by 
employing a less stringent standard when reviewing his 
petition. 
 
Second, while we agree that Hassine experienced 
excessive delay in the processing of his petition, we do not 
believe that he is entitled to habeas relief, including any 
altered standard for harmless error, even if the delay in the 
district court gave rise to a violation of his due process 
rights.10 In Heiser v. Ryan, 951 F.2d 559, 563 (3d Cir. 
1991) ("Heiser I"), we acknowledged that a delay in certain 
collateral proceedings can violate a prisoner's fundamental 
right to due process. We reviewed the claim of a petitioner 
whose state action for post-conviction relief had been 
pending for nearly four years, and we stated that"delays in 
post-verdict process may violate the Due Process Clause. 
. . . The due process clause protects against more than 
delay in trial and sentencing. It guarantees as well the right 
to attack a conviction." Id. 
 
After Heiser I was remanded to the district court, 
however, we clarified our earlier remarks by revisiting the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Hassine also argues that his appeal is different because no state court 
has ever conducted a Chapman review of his claims. As we discussed 
above, however, we believe that this does not alter our analysis in 
determining whether Brecht applies. 
 
10. While we certainly do not condone the extraordinary delay in 
processing Hassine's petition, we wish to make clear that we are not 
holding that the delay constituted a violation of due process. We hold 
merely that Hassine would not be entitled to relief through habeas 
corpus proceedings even if the delay did amount to a constitutional 
violation. 
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due process issue in a subsequent appeal. See Heiser v. 
Ryan, 15 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Heiser II"). In Heiser II, 
we still recognized that excessive delay in state collateral 
proceedings could violate due process, but we made clear 
that while the defendant could seek damages against 
counsel responsible for the delay, a writ of habeas corpus 
was not the proper remedy in such a case. Id. at 307. In 
other cases, we have indicated that petitioners experiencing 
delay can seek a writ of mandamus to compel the district 
court to reach a decision on the habeas claim. For example, 
in Madden v. Myers, we addressed a petitioner's argument 
that mandamus was warranted where seven months had 
elapsed since the filing of the Magistrate Judge's Report 
and Recommendation without any action by the district 
court. 102 F.3d 74, 76 (3d Cir. 1996). We ultimately denied 
the request, but, in our only published opinion on this 
issue, we noted that the petitioner's claims of delay had 
"force" and were "of concern." Id. at 79. Moreover, we stated 
that "[a]lthough this delay is of concern, it does not yet rise 
to the level of a denial of due process," implying that at 
some point, delay by the district court could become so 
excessive as to warrant the issuance of a writ of 
mandamus. Id. (emphasis added).11  We are not alone in 
entertaining writs of mandamus due to extraordinary 
federal delay. See, e.g., Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 
1285 (10th Cir. 1990) (granting a writ of mandamus after a 
fourteen-month delay by the district court); McClellan v. 
Young, 421 F.2d 690, 691 (6th Cir. 1970) (granting a writ 
of mandamus where the district court had delayed its 
habeas ruling pending a decision by the Supreme Court).12 
 
However, while we have shown a willingness to issue 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. In fact, a review of our unpublished opinions reveals that we 
routinely entertain mandamus petitions complaining of extraordinary 
delay in habeas corpus proceedings at the district court level. 
 
12. We hasten to add that "[t]he remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, 
to be invoked only in extraordinary circumstances." Kerr v. United States 
Dist. Ct., 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976). Thus, a habeas petitioner seeking 
mandamus in these cases must experience extraordinary delay, "must 
have no other adequate means to obtain the desired relief, and must 
show that the right to issuance is clear and indisputable." Madden, 102 
F.3d at 79. 
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writs of mandamus and to entertain lawsuits for damages, 
we have never granted habeas relief because of a delay in 
the processing of a petition, and we decline to do so here. 
The federal courts are authorized to provide collateral relief 
where a petitioner is in state custody or under a federal 
sentence imposed in violation of the Constitution or the 
laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C.SS 2254, 
2255. Thus, the federal role in reviewing an application for 
habeas corpus is limited to evaluating what occurred in the 
state or federal proceedings that actually led to the 
petitioner's conviction; what occurred in the petitioner's 
collateral proceeding does not enter into the habeas 
calculation. We have often noted the general proposition 
that habeas proceedings are "hybrid actions"; they are 
"independent civil dispositions of completed criminal 
proceedings." See, e.g., Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 
752, 754 (3d Cir. 1996). Federal habeas power is"limited 
. . . to a determination of whether there has been an 
improper detention by virtue of the state court judgment." 
Henderson v. Frank, No. 97-3041, 1998 WL 456254, at *9 
(3d Cir. Aug. 6, 1998). As the Seventh Circuit has noted, 
"[d]elay in processing [a] collateral claim does not make the 
continued imprisonment of the defendant unlawful, and 
hence, does not warrant federal habeas corpus relief." 
Montgomery v. Meloy, 90 F.3d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir. 1996), 
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 266 (1996); see also 
Jackson v. Duckworth, 112 F.3d 878, 880 (7th Cir.) (stating 
that "federal habeas corpus cannot remedy a delay in state 
collateral proceedings because such an error has absolutely 
nothing to do with the reason for a defendant's 
confinement"), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S. Ct. 380 
(1997).13 
 
Therefore, to the extent that a petitioner wishes to claim 
that delay in the processing of a collateral petition violates 
due process, we hold that the petitioner's remedy, if any, is 
through such avenues as a lawsuit for damages or a writ of 
mandamus rather than through the habeas corpus 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Providing relief to a petitioner in state custody because of a delay 
in 
the federal courts would also greatly undermine principles of federalism 
and comity by disturbing a state court judgment due to a federal court 
error. 
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proceeding itself. In the case at bar, we thus conclude that 
Brecht still applies in evaluating whether the Doyle violation 
at Hassine's trial constituted harmless error. 
 
C. Application of the Brecht Standard for Harm less Error 
 
Having found that Brecht applies to Hassine's petition, we 
proceed next to an examination of whether the district 
court properly concluded that the prosecution's Doyle 
violation was harmless.14 Under Brecht and its progeny, a 
constitutional trial error is not harmless if the court is in 
"grave doubt" as to whether the error had a substantial and 
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's 
verdict. O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995). 
"Grave doubt" exists when, "in the judge's mind, the matter 
is so evenly balanced that he feels himself in virtual 
equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error." Id. at 435. 
Moreover, it is "inappropriate to ask whether there was 
sufficient evidence to support the result, apart from the 
phase of the trial affected by the error. The correct inquiry 
is whether the error had a substantial influence on the 
verdict despite sufficient evidence to support the result 
apart from the error." Yohn, 76 F.3d at 523 (citations 
omitted). 
 
Hassine contends that the Doyle violation could not have 
been harmless because it went to the heart of his defense. 
He maintains that because he was the only witness 
testifying as to his version of the events, and because the 
Doyle error undermined his credibility, it necessarily had a 
"substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining 
the jury's verdict." Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623 (quoting 
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776). In evaluating Hassine's claim, 
we must thus determine whether, and to what extent, the 
jury's decision to accept the State's version of the facts 
rather than Hassine's was influenced by the prosecutor's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. The district court also evaluated Hassine's claim under Chapman, 
stating in a footnote that "the record establishes sufficient evidence of 
Hassine's guilt to suggest that the Doyle error would have been harmless 
under the Chapman reasonable-doubt standard as well." Hassine III, 
1997 WL 677152, at *10 n.8. However, we need not reach this issue 
because we have determined that Chapman does not apply. 
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Doyle violation. If the jury disbelieved Hassine and 
convicted him because of the Doyle violation, the error was 
not harmless and we will grant the petition. The crucial 
inquiry is the "impact of the error on the minds of the 
jurors in the total setting." Yohn, 76 F.3d at 523 (citing 
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764). While the nature of the 
evidence against Hassine is important, we must also 
examine the phases of the trial affected by the error, and 
determine whether the error had a substantial influence on 
the verdict despite sufficient evidence to support the result 
apart from the error. See id. (citing Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 
765). In so doing, we must of necessity weigh the impact of 
evidence on the jury and cannot help but make a judgment 
as to how the jury would reasonably perceive Hasssine's 
version of events with and without the Doyle violation. 
 
At the outset, we note our agreement with the district 
court's finding that the evidence, as mounted through a 
parade of Commonwealth witnesses, was substantial 
indeed. The witnesses testifying as to Hassine's planning of, 
and intent to commit, the crime were numerous, and their 
stories consistent.15 A number of witnesses testified to an 
initial meeting in which Hassine called for Kellet's 
execution. (N.T. 34, 111-12, 743-44, 756-57, 810, 822).16 
Several witnesses also recalled that Hassine had actively 
searched for a weapon to carry out his plan: at the initial 
meeting, he demanded that the other employees try to 
procure a weapon (N.T. 36, 744, 774); he had discussed 
buying a .357 with Breed members Tuite and Schwab (N.T. 
56-59, 555-57, 626-27); he asked his employee Ron 
Wharton to buy a gun and to participate in the plan to kill 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. The Commonwealth put 34 witnesses on the stand. Among those 
witnesses central to the Commonwealth's case were: 1) Eric Decker, a 
sometime employee of Hassine's who shot the Kellets, Sofield, and 
Puerale; 2) Greg Orlowski, the manager and day-to-day owner of the 
Market; 3) Ron Wharton and Billy Hayes, employees at the Market; 4) 
Valerie Lynch, Decker's girlfriend; 5) Ron Tuite and Joseph "Critter" 
Schwab, members of the Breed motorcycle gang; and 6) Theodore 
Camera, a tenant of the Hassine family and a former classmate of 
Hassine's. 
 
16. Ron Wharton recalled Hassine stating that, "He wanted him wasted. 
He had to set an example." (N.T. 744). 
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Kellet (N.T. 747, 760); and he visited his tenant Theodore 
Camera and asked Camera to find him a gun. (N.T. 485-86, 
487-88, 490). 
 
Hassine settled on a weapon for the shootings: a stolen 
.25 caliber automatic handgun. (N.T. 933). Both Decker 
and Wharton testified that Hassine gave Decker the.25 
while the three were in the Market van. (N.T. 53, 749).17 
Hassine and Decker also went to a gun store where Hassine 
bought a box of ammunition and signed for the purchase. 
(N.T. 59-60, 708-10). 
 
After buying the bullets, Decker and Hassine drove by 
Kellet's house, where Hassine told Decker to shoot him 
then and there with the .25. (N.T. 61). Decker declined 
because it was daytime, and a witness was present. (N.T. 
61-62). Hassine and Decker repeatedly test fired the gun 
into the back wall of the store, but the .25 was 
malfunctioning and had to be put aside, despite their 
attempts to fix it. (N.T. 58-60, 62-63, 750-52, 811-12).18 
 
Hassine and his co-defendant Orlowski also met with 
Breed members Tuite and Schwab to discuss killing Kellet. 
After bailing Tuite out of jail on a gun charge involving the 
.357, Hassine contacted him about a "deal" involving Kellet, 
and the four met to discuss a contract killing. (N.T. 557, 
560, 560-61, 562, 627, 630, 753-55).19  Tuite and Schwab's 
asking price of $1500 was too high, however, so the four 
agreed instead that they would beat Kellet up for $500 
($250 credit for the bail and $250 for the beating). (N.T. 
560-62, 563, 628-629, 632).20 Rather than attack Kellet, as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Decker testified that Hassine handed him the gun and stated "here, 
hit him in the head and leave it there." (N.T. 53). 
 
18. The .25, a spent shell, and photos of the holes in the Market wall 
were entered into evidence. (N.T. 51-52, 792-97, 800-01). 
19. Both Tuite and Schwab testified that Hassine appeared upset and 
angered by the challenge Kellet posed to his authority. Tuite: "Hassine 
was pissed off--pissed off that somebody would step on his toes." (N.T. 
563). Schwab: Hassine was "ruffled because somebody messed with one 
of his boys." (N.T. 628). 
 
20. Schwab mentioned that Orlowski and Hassine wanted to continue to 
consider the possibility of killing Kellet for money: "They were haggling 
back and forth about the fifteen hundred bucks, so I took the two fifty. 
They wanted a night to think about if it was worth fifteen hundred bucks 
to waste Kellet." (N.T. 629-30). 
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agreed, however, Tuite and Schwab decided to warn Kellet 
that Hassine and Orlowski wanted to kill him and kept the 
$250. (N.T. 566, 630).21 
 
The Commonwealth also presented evidence of Hassine's 
conduct both at and after the incident that pointed to his 
guilt. On the night of the shootings, Decker testified that he 
met Hassine at the market and said, "Tonight's the night-- 
this cat has got to go. We'll use your gun. I want two 
hundred and fifty dollars." (N.T. at 77, 218-19). Hassine 
agreed and said he would come back to pick Decker up 
with his car. Id. Decker further testified that Hassine then 
drove him to Trenton and retrieved the .380 Llama 
handgun used in the shootings from his parents' house; 
gave him directions to Kellet's house; told him that he 
would wait for him and drive him away after the shootings; 
and gave him a Yankees batting helmet to disguise himself 
during the shootings. (N.T. 83-85, 87-88). 
 
Hassine then went to Orlowski's house, where Hassine 
and Orlowski met a third person, Michael Thompson 
("Thompson"), who testified that all three got into his car. 
(N.T. 861-63). Hassine was carrying a metal pipe. (N.T. 
870). Hassine told Thompson to drive to the parking lot 
across the street from Kellet's residence and then to other 
locations; Hassine whistled out the window from time to 
time, and at one point Hassine told Thompson to get out of 
the car and call for "Eric". (N.T. 863-870, 874-884, 905-07).22 
In the course of their drive, they heard two shots, and 
Hassine stated, "Oh shit, that's my father's gun, I hope that 
asshole doesn't get caught." (N.T. 868-69, 881, 1224). 
 
After the murder, when Hassine and Orlowski returned 
from their attempts to find Decker, Hassine told Orlowski 
that they still had to find Decker, because he was afraid 
Decker would be arrested. (N.T. 1227-28). The following 
morning, Hassine told his employee Wharton to drive the 
pair to Decker's apartment, so they could try once again to 
retrieve the .380 from Decker. (N.T. 761). When they 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. Hassine later complained that Tuite and Schwab had "ripped him 
off." (N.T. 755). 
 
22. In the course of their drive, the three went to the Dunkin' Donuts, 
where Hassine mentioned that they had been seen. (N.T. 867). 
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realized Decker had been arrested, Hassine told Decker's 
girlfriend, Valerie Lynch, to get rid of the gun. (N.T. 761-63, 
1043-44, 1046-47). As word spread that the case against 
Hassine was building, Tuite and Schwab decided to try to 
intimidate Hassine into giving them $10,000 to kill 
Commonwealth witnesses, and Hassine considered their 
demands but did not ask them to follow through on the plan.23 
(N.T. 568, 572, 577-78, 631-32). 
 
Not only did the Commonwealth's case present evidence 
of Hassine's guilt but also evidence of both a coverup and 
instances of lying that detracted from Hassine's credibility. 
On the night of the shootings, Hassine told his co- 
defendant Orlowski to keep his "mouth shut" if the police 
questioned him. (N.T. 1228). Hassine's attempts to 
influence others continued as the investigation intensified. 
After Decker was arrested for the shootings, Hassine tried 
to make Orlowski sign a statement holding him responsible 
for the crimes, and the two held practice sessions in which 
Hassine and Orlowski practiced Orlowski's story. (N.T. 
1388-90). Valerie Lynch testified that Hassine told her to lie 
about his and Decker's whereabouts the night of the 
shootings, saying: "Remember, Valerie, I was in New York, 
and Eric Decker was at home." (N.T. 764-65, 1051-52). In 
the course of an intercepted phone conversation, Hassine 
queried Thompson about what Thompson had told the 
police during questioning, and in the course of that 
conversation the two agreed, ostensibly, that they would 
keep each other out of the case.24 (N.T. 892-94, 901). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. Schwab testified as follows: 
 
       He was all frazzled; he was confused -- "I can't think--I don't 
know 
       what to do" -- imbalanced -- all that shit, and he walked around. 
       He said he would talk to his old man to see if he could come up 
       with some bucks. 
 
       Q: Did you talk to him any more after that, Mr. Schwab? 
 
       A: Yeah -- one more time . . . . I told him the pressure was coming 
       down on him. And he said he would try again to get the money. I 
       told him I would take a van load of steaks--pack the van with 
       steaks and give me five grand. (N.T. 631-32). 
 
24. V: So, as far as they're concerned, you know, you were with 
somebody else that night, right? 
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Hassine had made promises to Decker as a part of his 
agreement to kill Kellet -- an apartment, money, and a 
future on "easy street" -- and he continued the practice of 
offering money or services for cooperation from others after 
the shootings had taken place. (N.T. 63, 111, 752-53, 773). 
In the course of the conversation in which he urged her to 
lie, Hassine also promised Lynch that he would help her 
and her child out with money, cuts of meat, or anything 
else she needed. (N.T. 1052). Hassine also promised 
Thompson, in the course of their intercepted phone 
conversation, that Thompson should look into buying 
Kellet's house, and that the two could enter into a deal 
whereby Hassine would put up the money for the house 
and the surrounding property, and Thompson could keep 
the house while Hassine developed the lot. (N.T. 896-97, 
897-900). In his own testimony, Hassine admitted that he 
had no intention of buying the house or developing the lot, 
but he was making the promise because he wanted to know 
what Thompson told the police. (N.T. 1563-64).25 
 
Notwithstanding the weight of the evidence presented by 
the prosecution, we would have little difficultyfinding that 
the Doyle violation had substantially influenced the jury if, 
apart from the violation, the phase of the trial most directly 
impacted, namely, Hassine's testimony, presented a strong 
counter to the state's evidence. But that is not the case. 
Hassine's story was undermined not only by evidence of his 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
M: Yeah, as far as they're concerned I wasn't even with you. 
 
V: You weren't. 
 
M: Yeah. (N.T. 901). 
 
25. The weaknesses of the Commonwealth's witnesses were exposed in 
the course of both direct and cross-examination. Decker was cross 
examined on his frequent use of methamphetamine, prior record, 
shifting stories, and his cooperation with the Commonwealth. (N.T. 116- 
17, 130-32, 132-35, 136, 138, 215). Other witnesses were questioned 
about their prior denials to the police, changes in accounts, drug usage, 
conflicts with Hassine, bias in favor of Orlowski, or reluctance to 
testify. 
(N.T. 569-70, 632-33, 769-71, 784-86, 787-88, 789, 789-90, 872, 903, 
963-64). As such, the jury had ample opportunity to consider the 
credibility and relative sophistication of the Commonwealth's witnesses. 
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disregard for the truth, but by his own testimony in which 
he set forth strained and unrealistic explanations for his 
conduct and portrayed himself as a mild mannered store 
manager and law student -- a portrayal strikingly at odds 
with other evidence depicting his behavior as controlling, 
crude, and vulgar. In the course of his testimony, Hassine 
portrayed himself as a diligent law student who spent the 
bulk of his summer studying for the New Jersey and New 
York bar exams, which he did not pass. (N.T. 1436-38, 
1450-52). Hassine also presented himself as a sophisticated 
individual versed in business practices who was concerned 
about the management of the market. Hassine testified that 
he made Orlowski run the store efficiently, and that he had 
threatened to close the store if Orlowski did not run it in a 
cost-effective manner. (N.T. 1414-1422, 1492-93). He also 
testified that he was aware of the drug dealing at the store 
after Kellet had beaten and stolen money from Orlowski, 
but that he never participated in or profited from the drug 
dealing. (N.T. 1424, 1510).26 He testified that when Wharton 
took $40 from the register to front a drug deal, he punched 
him, but did so because he wanted nothing to do with 
Wharton's activities. (N.T. 1426-27, 1492-93). 
 
Hassine denied having any feud with Kellet, having any 
animosity toward Kellet, or saying that he wanted Kellet 
killed or "wasted," claiming instead that he had only 
wanted Kellet to be put in jail. (N.T. 1428-29, 1432-34, 
1496, 1497-98, 1500, 1553).27 Hassine also testified that by 
saying he wanted to make an "example of Kellet," he meant 
that any time Kellet made any motion toward him or any 
contact with him the police should be called. (N.T. 1429). 
 
Hassine also testified that he had, in fact, rebuffed Tuite 
and Schwab's offer to kill Kellet for him by indicating that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. Wharton had testified that Hassine insisted that the drugs be "cut" 
to increase profits. (N.T. 780-81). Hassine also referred to Thompson as 
"Mr. Reds" in his testimony and in the course of the recorded 
conversation played for the jury. (N.T. 1470, 1507-08). 
 
27. Kellet himself testified to the pattern of escalating threats and 
harassment between himself, Orlowski, and Hassine prior to the 
shootings, as well as prior tensions between himself and Hassine. (N.T. 
382-83, 394-99). 
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the situation with Kellet was being handled by the police. 
(N.T. 1455-59). Hassine claimed to have no idea why Tuite 
and Schwab would think he would want Kellet killed. (N.T. 
1455, 1492). 
 
Hassine admitted that he had engaged in a complex 
course of behavior involving guns, but testified that his 
search for a weapon was undertaken in order to find 
adequate protection for the store. He conceded that he had 
contacted Camera about obtaining a gun, even though he 
knew he could purchase a gun legally; that he had bought 
bullets and signed the register at the gun store because 
Decker had asked him to do so, even though he knew that 
Decker was on probation for a gun charge; and that he had 
shot up the wall of the store with Decker because Decker 
wanted to demonstrate problems with the gun and he just 
got "carried away" in the process. (N.T. 1430-31, 1436, 
1445-46, 1449-50, 1549-52, 1553, 1556-58). Hassine also 
explained his conduct on the night of the shootings as 
being motivated by his desire to get his father's gun back 
and to prevent a crime from occurring. (N.T. 1466-68, 
1526-29, 1521-32). 
 
Hassine's version of events was further undercut by 
evidence that he was not the mild-mannered person he 
portrayed himself to be. There was testimony as to his 
threatening and controlling Orlowski, his need to be a boss 
of others and his desire to protect his turf and his 
authority, even if doing so entailed resort to violence. (N.T. 
488-89, 490, 555, 563, 628, 755, 783, 861-62, 816, 1051, 
1441, 1454-55). Other evidence, some of which was 
conceded in Hassine's own testimony, demonstrated that 
Hassine had violent tendencies, through incidents such as 
his pulling Orlowski's finger out of its socket during an 
argument and punching Wharton, and through his 
practices of engaging in threats and feuding. (N.T. 382-83, 
1498, 1508, 1556). 
 
The Doyle violation occurred as a series of three 
questions in the midst of Hassine's testimony, and, later, in 
two ambiguous references to Hassine's silence in the 
prosecutor's closing argument. (N.T. 1543-1544, E.H. 223, 
259-60). Based on our assessment of the trial evidence, we 
conclude that the questions posed in the midst of Hassine's 
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testimony did not have a substantial or injurious effect on 
the jury's verdict. Nor did the two ambiguous references 
made to a general pattern of silence result in an 
overemphasis on this silence that destroyed the jury's 
ability to look at the evidence in the case, as Hassine 
contends. Rather, these statements were couched within a 
general framework of asking the jury to consider the 
credibility of the witnesses as a whole, and as such, the 
closing provided the jury with ample latitude to evaluate 
Hassine's credibility and the evidence of his guilt apart from 
those particular statements. 
 
While not minimizing the importance of the right at issue 
or condoning the prosecutor's conduct, we find that the 
actual effect of the Doyle violation on Hassine's credibility 
before the jury and the inferences drawn by that jury, and 
on the jury's determination of guilt or innocence, was 
minimal, as the improper questions and statements 
occurred within a contextual presentation of a story that 
was, on its own, not likely to be viewed as credible. Given 
the overwhelming evidence of Hassine's guilt, and his lack 
of credibility apart from the Doyle violation, we conclude 
that the constitutional error at Hassine's trial was 
harmless; there is little doubt that the prosecutor's Doyle 
violation did not have a "substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht, 507 
U.S. at 623 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776). 
 
D. The Footnote Nine Exception to Brecht 
 
Hassine's final argument is that even if the Doyle error 
did not substantially influence the jury, he is still entitled 
to relief under an exception to the harmless error rule 
noted in Brecht. In footnote nine of the Brecht opinion, the 
Supreme Court stated: 
 
       Our holding does not foreclose the possibility that in 
       an unusual case, a deliberate and especially egregious 
       error of the trial type, or one that is combined with a 
       pattern of prosecutorial misconduct, might so infect 
       the integrity of the proceeding as to warrant the grant 
       of habeas relief, even if it did not substantially 
       influence the jury's verdict. Cf. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 
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       756, 769, 107 S. Ct. 3102, 3110, 97 L. Ed. 2d 618 
       (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). 
 
507 U.S. at 638 n.9. Hassine contends that this casefits 
squarely within the Footnote Nine exception, because the 
state prosecutor committed a "deliberate and especially 
egregious error" at trial. He argues that "it was nothing 
other than deliberate for the very experienced prosecutor to 
persist in pointedly cross-examining Hassine about his 
post-arrest silence," and maintains that it was "anything 
short of deliberate" and egregious when the prosector 
commented on Hassine's post-arrest silence during closing 
arguments. (Pet'r Br. at 34 n.14.)28 However, after reviewing 
the origins of the Footnote Nine exception and the few cases 
in which it has been applied, we conclude that the 
prosecutor's Doyle violation did not rise to the level needed 
to warrant habeas relief.29 
 
As the citation in Footnote Nine acknowledges, the 
exception to Brecht's harmless error standard has its roots 
in the views of Justice Stevens, who has written on several 
occasions that habeas petitions should be granted where 
trial errors are truly extraordinary, even if they are found to 
constitute harmless error. Brecht itself cites to Justice 
Stevens' concurrence in Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. at 767, 
which, in turn, refers to the Justice Stevens dissent in Rose 
v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 538 (1982). In Rose, Justice 
Stevens argued that there are at least four types of 
constitutional error: 
 
       The one most frequently encountered is a claim that 
       attaches a constitutional label to a set of facts that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
28. Hassine does not contend that the error falls within Footnote Nine's 
prohibition on errors "combined with a pattern of prosecutorial 
misconduct." Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638 n.9. He argues only that the Doyle 
violation was sufficiently "deliberate and . . . egregious" to warrant 
habeas relief. We will thus limit our analysis to this aspect. 
 
29. It is worth noting that Brecht does not truly establish an exception 
for "deliberate and especially egregious errors;" it merely "does not 
foreclose the possibility" that such an exception could exist. 507 U.S. 
638 n.9. Nevertheless, for purposes of this discussion, we will assume 
arguendo that Footnote Nine does support awarding habeas relief for 
egregious errors in an appropriate case. 
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       does not disclose a violation of any constitutional right. 
       . . . The second class includes constitutional violations 
       that are not of sufficient import in a particular case to 
       justify reversal even on direct appeal, when the 
       evidence is still fresh and a fair retrial could be 
       promptly conducted. . . . A third category includes 
       errors that are important enough to require reversal on 
       direct appeal but do not reveal the kind of fundamental 
       unfairness to the accused that will support a collateral 
       attack on a final judgment. . . . The fourth category 
       includes those errors that are so fundamental that they 
       infect the validity of the underlying judgment itself, or 
       the integrity of the process by which that judgment 
       was obtained. 
 
Id. at 543-44 (dissenting opinion) (citations and footnote 
omitted). 
 
It is, of course, this fourth category that the Court 
referenced eleven years later in Brecht as a potential 
exception to the harmless error standard. Justice Stevens 
has admitted that "[t]his category cannot be defined 
precisely," id. at 544, but his opinions in Rose and Greer do 
provide some guidance as to which infractions are to be 
considered `fundamentally' unfair. In Rose, Justice Stevens 
explained that the "error that falls in this category is best 
illustrated by recalling the classic grounds for the issuance 
of a writ of habeas corpus -- that the proceeding was 
dominated by mob violence; that the prosecutor knowingly 
made use of perjured testimony; or that the conviction was 
based on a confession extorted from the defendant by 
brutal methods." Id. (footnotes omitted). In his view, 
"[e]rrors of this kind justify collateral relief no matter how 
long a judgment may have been final and even though they 
may not have been preserved properly in the original trial." 
Id. (footnotes omitted). Further, in Greer, Justice Stevens 
applied these principles to Doyle violations, writing that 
"there may be extraordinary cases in which the Doyle error 
is so egregious, or is combined with other errors or 
incidents of prosecutorial misconduct, that the integrity of 
the process is called into question. In such an event, 
habeas corpus relief should be afforded." 483 U.S. at 769 
(concurring). 
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Brecht itself sheds light on the Footnote Nine exception 
as well. Brecht involved a petitioner convicted of first-degree 
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The petitioner 
took the stand at trial and admitted that he had fatally 
wounded his brother-in-law, Roger Hartman, but he 
claimed that the killing was accidental. Over the objections 
of defense counsel, and in violation of Doyle , the State 
asked the petitioner on cross-examination and again on re- 
cross-examination "whether he had told anyone at any time 
before trial that the shooting was an accident, to which 
petitioner replied `no.' " 507 U.S. at 625. The prosecutor 
then made three glaring references to the petitioner's pre- 
trial silence during closing arguments, urging the jury to 
" `remember that Mr. Brecht never volunteered until in this 
courtroom what happened in the Hartman residence,' " 
stating that " `[h]e sits back here and sees all of our 
evidence go in and then he comes out with this crazy 
story,' " and reminding the jury that the petitioner " `didn't 
say' " this was an accident, " `[n]o, he waited until he hears 
our story.' " Id. at 625 n.2 (quoting the record in the case). 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court still applied a harmless 
error standard, so that the facts in Brecht did not involve "a 
deliberate and especially egregious error of the trial type, or 
one that is combined with a pattern of prosecutorial 
misconduct" as reflected in Footnote Nine. Id. at 638 n.9. 
As the Court wrote, "[w]e, of course, are not presented with 
such a situation here." Id.30  
 
With this in mind, we too conclude that we are not here 
presented with the type of egregious situation alluded to in 
Footnote Nine. First, the error in this case was much less 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
30. We are aware of only two federal circuit court opinions discussing the 
Footnote Nine exception in detail, but neither of these cases is helpful 
to 
our discussion. We addressed the Brecht exception in Robinson v. 
Arvonio, 27 F.3d 877, 886 (3d Cir. 1994), but Robinson was later vacated 
on appeal to the Supreme Court and is no longer good law. See Robinson 
v. Arvonio, 513 U.S. 1186 (1995). In addition, the Ninth Circuit 
discussed Footnote Nine in Hardnett v. Marshall, 25 F.3d 875, 879-81 
(9th Cir. 1994), but, in contrast to the instant case, Hardnett involved 
an 
error that was ultimately found to be irrelevant to the jury's verdict. We 
will thus limit our analysis to Supreme Court precedents discussing the 
Brecht exception. 
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egregious than in Brecht where the Court did employ a 
harmless error analysis. At Hassine's trial, objections were 
immediately raised and sustained, Hassine never answered 
the improper questions, and the prosecutor's references to 
Hassine's silence during closing arguments were 
ambiguous. See supra. Therefore, if the Supreme Court 
believed that Brecht was not "of course" a Footnote Nine 
case, we fail to see how Hassine's case could possibly 
qualify under the Brecht exception. 
 
Second, we do not believe that the prosecutor's actions 
here were "deliberate and especially egregious" within the 
meaning of Footnote Nine. As we discussed supra, there 
was some evidence that Hassine had opened the door to 
questions about his post-arrest silence by testifying that he 
was "available" for questioning by the police. In fact, this is 
precisely what the Pennsylvania Superior Court found on 
direct appeal of Hassine's claim. See Hassine I, 490 A.2d at 
451. Thus, while we now disagree with the Superior Court 
and find that the questions were inappropriate, we cannot 
say that the prosecutor's actions were so deliberate and 
egregious as to warrant habeas relief that bypasses 
harmless error scrutiny. 
 
Finally, we conclude that the Doyle violation did not "so 
infect the integrity of the proceeding," Brecht, 507 U.S. at 
638 n.9, or "call[ ] into question" the integrity of the trial 
process, Greer, 483 U.S. at 769 (Stevens, J., concurring), so 
as to warrant the grant of habeas relief to Hassine. As we 
have discussed, the Doyle violation in this case consisted of 
three unanswered questions, occupying just one page in a 
transcript of more than 1500 pages of testimony, in 
addition to two ambiguous references to Hassine's silence 
during closing arguments. Moreover, the State called thirty- 
four witnesses on its behalf and impeached Hassine's 
testimony on several different grounds. Under these 
circumstances, we do not believe that Hassine's case can be 
classified as the "unusual," Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638 n.9, or 
"extraordinary," Greer, 483 U.S. at 769 (Stevens, J., 
concurring), proceeding in which relief can be granted 
pursuant to Footnote Nine. The Doyle violation at Hassine's 
trial was significant, but we remain confident that its 
impact on the entire case was not so profound as to infect 
the very integrity of Hassine's conviction. 
 




For the foregoing reasons, the district court's Order dated 
October 30, 1997, will be affirmed. 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, Concurring. 
 
I believe the majority reaches the correct result, agree 
with its reasoning, and, so I concur in its judgment. I write 
separately only to add my thoughts to Section III, D of its 
opinion, and express my indignation with the prosecuting 
attorney's misbehavior. 
 
The concept of an accused's right to remain silent, to be 
free from prosecutorial comment about that silence, and to 
be free from any adverse consequences from accepting this 
constitutional protection, is so fundamental in our 
jurisprudence, and is so well known among practitioners, 
that I cannot conceive of any alternative but that the 
prosecutor's use of Hassine's silence was both deliberate 
and calculated to invite the jury to draw an adverse 
inference from it. Moreover, I believe this deliberate 
violation of Mr. Hassine's constitutional rights is egregious 
-- indeed, it is outrageous. The prosecutor not only 
questioned Hassine about his silence, but continued to do 
so even after objections to the questions were sustained by 
the trial court. This arrogance towards the court's ruling 
and the accused's rights, is reprehensible. 
 
Nonetheless, on this habeas corpus review, I cannot say 
that his behavior, although unprofessional, "so infected" the 
trial's integrity, that it requires us to grant Hassine relief. 
Moreover, even though the prosecutor again made reference 
to Hassine's silence in his closing argument, considering 
the entire record, I agree with the majority -- we cannot say 
that his action constituted a "pattern" of misconduct. The 
prosecutor's act was unfair, for which he deserves a stern 
rebuke. Hassine, nonetheless, received a fair trial. 
 
Hence, although the prosecutor's behavior came very 
close to crossing the line of harm, and came even closer to 
that "unusual" case in which relief could be granted 
regardless of harm, I agree with the majority that it did not. 
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